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LGBT RIGHTS:  
GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION IN THE WORKPLACE 
 
BY 
TAYLOR E. MUZZY 
 
Taylor Muzzy is a partner at the firm Jacobs, Burns, Orlove & Hernandez and is a 2008 graduate of 
Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, with a certificate in Labor and 
Employment Law.1  He represents: employees in employment discrimination, FLSA, FMLA, and wage 
payment collection litigation; labor unions in grievance and interest arbitrations, unfair labor practice 
proceedings, contract negotiations; and federal and state litigation; and public pension funds with 
respect to compliance issues and federal and state litigation.  Thanks to my colleague Charles P. Burns 
his help in preparing this paper. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) 
individuals remains a significant factor in U.S. workplaces. According to research 
conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, 
42 percent of LGBT individuals reported at least one form of employment 
discrimination because of their sexual orientation, and 27 percent reported 
experiencing such discrimination in the past five years.[1] Research shows even 
more striking results with respect to discrimination against transgender 
individuals: the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey revealed that 77 percent of 
respondents who held or applied for a job in the past year reported experiencing 
some form of discrimination or taking steps to avoid discrimination at work,[2] 
and 27 percent reported experiencing an adverse job outcome due to their gender 
identity or expression in the past year.[3] Transgender individuals are three times 
more likely than the U.S. adult population to be unemployed, more than twice as 
likely to be living in poverty, and more than three times as likely to have an annual 
household income below $10,000.[4] These numbers increase dramatically when 
race, disabilities, and status as undocumented residents are considered.[5] 
Despite these troubling results, 69 percent of respondents who were fired because 
of their gender identity or expression took no action in response to being fired and 
only 14 percent filed a formal complaint, either internally or with the EEOC or state 
or local human rights agency; 15 percent contacted a lawyer; and a paltry 2 percent 
contacted their union representative.[6]  This low rate of protest may be partially 
attributed to the fact that there are currently no federal laws that explicitly prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender 
                                            
1 The Supreme Court of Illinois does not recognize certifications of specialties in the practice of law and the certificate is not a requirement to practice 
law in Illinois. 
 




expression. In the absence of action by Congress, courts have expanded protections 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the First Amendment, and the Family and 
Medical Leave Act.  
This article surveys the current scope of LGBT protections for public employees 
under federal and state law, and examines potential expansions of these 
protections. Part II examines the extent to which federal and state laws have been 
successful in bringing sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression 
under the umbrella of currently-existing legislative or constitutional protections. 
Part III examines attempts to expand protections for LGBT employees and 
assesses the potential for collective bargaining to provide expanded benefits in the 
absence of legislative change. 
 
A. Glossary Of Terms 
The language used to describe members of the LGBT community is highly variable, 
and often incorporates factors of class, race, culture, region, education and age.[7] 
This article uses the following definitions to provide a structure around which to 
meaningfully and respectfully discuss LGBT issues in the workplace.[8] 
 
 Gender Dysphoria: Clinically significant distress caused when a person's 
assigned birth gender is not the same as the one with which they identify. 
According to the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the term – which replaces Gender Identity 
Disorder – "is intended to better characterize the experiences of affected children, 
adolescents, and adults." 
 Gender Expression: External appearance of one's gender identity, usually 
expressed through behavior, clothing, haircut or voice, and which may or may not 
conform to socially defined behaviors and characteristics typically associated with 
being either masculine or feminine. 
 Gender Identity: One's innermost concept of self as male, female, a blend of both 
or neither – how individuals perceive themselves and what they call themselves. 
One's gender identity can be the same or different from their sex assigned at birth. 
 Gender Transition: The process by which some people strive to more closely 
align their internal knowledge of gender with its outward appearance. Some people 
socially transition, whereby they might begin dressing, using names and pronouns 
and/or be socially recognized as another gender. Others undergo physical 
transitions in which they modify their bodies through medical interventions. 
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 Sexual Orientation: An inherent or immutable enduring emotional, romantic 
or sexual attraction to other people. A person's sexual orientation is distinct from 
a person's gender identity and gender expression. 
 Transgender: An umbrella term for people whose gender identity and/or 
expression is different from those typically associated with the sex assigned to 
them at birth (e.g., the sex listed on their birth certificate). Being transgender does 
not imply any specific sexual orientation.  Transgender people may identify as 
straight, gay, lesbian, bisexual, etc. 
II. EXPANDING RIGHTS FOR LGBT EMPLOYEES UNDER 
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW 
A.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964  
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”[9] Title VII applies to 
employers with 15 or more employees, including state and local governments, 
employment agencies, labor organizations, and the federal government.[10] While 
Title VII does not specifically address sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender 
expression, courts have interpreted Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination to 
protect against discrimination based on sex stereotypes, and have further 
expanded that protected classification to cover sexual orientation and gender 
identity discrimination.  
The Supreme Court laid the foundation for LGBT protections under Title VII in 
two key decisions, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins[11] and Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Services.[12] In Price Waterhouse, an accounting firm denied Ann 
Hopkins a promotion because other partners at the firm felt that she did not act as 
a woman should act and told her that she needed to “walk more femininely, talk 
more femininely, [and] dress more femininely” in order to secure a 
partnership.[13] The Supreme Court held that Title VII’s “because of sex” provision 
prohibits the “entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting 
from sex stereotypes.”[14] As the Court explained, “an employer who acts on the 
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has 
acted on the basis of gender.”[15]  Nearly a decade later, in Oncale, the Supreme 
Court held that same-sex harassment can be sex discrimination under Title VII.[16]  
The Court noted that, while same-sex harassment was "assuredly not the principal 
evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII, the prohibition on 
sexual harassment “must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the 
statutory requirements.”[17]  




 Federal Court Decisions Finding Coverage for Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination 
In response to the Price Waterhouse and Oncale decisions, many federal courts 
have found that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation constitutes a form 
of discrimination based on sex. Courts are divided, however, as to whether sexual 
orientation discrimination constitutes sex stereotype discrimination per se or 
whether discrimination is actionable only when it is based on sex stereotyping 
irrespective of an employee’s sexual orientation. For example, in Heller v. 
Columbia Edgewater Country Club, a Title VII sex harassment case brought by a 
lesbian employee who was subjected to negative comments about her sex life, the 
court reasoned that the belief that men or women should only be attracted to or 
date persons of the opposite sex constitutes a gender stereotype.[18]  Similarly, in 
Terveer v. Billington,  an employee alleged that his employer violated Title VII by 
denying him promotions and creating a hostile work environment because he was 
"a homosexual male whose sexual orientation is not consistent with the 
Defendant's perception of acceptable gender roles.”[19] The court held that an 
employee’s claim that his supervisor discriminated against him because he is 
married to a man and took his husband's last name “is a claim of discrimination 
because of sex.”[20] In both Heller and Terveer, the courts found that because 
sexual orientation discrimination is necessarily premised on the gender of the 
employee and the employee’s preferred romantic partners, sexual orientation 
discrimination is per se discrimination based on the sex.  
In contrast, other courts have attempted to distinguish between discrimination 
targeting sexual orientation and discrimination based on nonconformity with 
sexual stereotypes. These courts hold that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination 
based on nonconformity with gender stereotypes "should not be used to 'bootstrap 
protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.’”[21] Thus, while discrimination on 
the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation may be actionable, it must be 
connected directly to gender stereotypes. For example, in EEOC v. Boh Brothers 
Construction Co., the heterosexual male plaintiff endured abuse in the form of 
sexual slurs, acts, and sexual-orientation based epithets from his heterosexual 
male supervisor.[22] The court held that the conduct was actionable, finding that 
although  
 
[i]t may be difficult judicially to assess whether and how harassment between two 
members of the same sex, neither of whom is homosexual, is ‘because of’ the victim’s sex… 
cruelty and irrationality typify harassment, prejudice, stereotyping and hostility generally 
… and we echo the Supreme Court's confidence that "[c]ommon sense, and an appropriate 
sensitivity to social context will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple 
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teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct which a 
reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive.[23]  
A New York District Court recently explained this distinction in Christiansen v. 
Omnicom, Group, Inc., holding that allegations of harassment that included lewd 
pictures of the plaintiff drawn on the office white board, remarks about the 
plaintiff’s sexuality, and other derogatory conduct, demonstrated “sexual-
orientation-based discriminatory animus.”[24] However, the court found that the 
plaintiff failed to prove he was harassed because he was effeminate or otherwise 
failed to conform to gender stereotypes and that therefore it was bound to apply 
Second Circuit precedent disallowing Title VII sex discrimination claims based on 
sexual orientation.[25] Nevertheless, the court included an extensive critique of 
that precedent and others, observing, "In light of the EEOC's recent decision on 
Title VII's scope, and the demonstrated impracticality of considering sexual 
orientation discrimination as categorically different from sexual stereotyping, one 
might reasonably ask - and, lest there be any doubt, this Court is asking - whether 
that line should be erased.”[26] 
 Federal Court Decisions Finding Coverage for Transgender 
Discrimination 
Many federal courts have also applied Title VII’s prohibition on sex stereotyping 
to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity and expression.[27] As 
with sexual orientation, courts are divided as to whether discrimination on the 
basis of gender identity or expression constitutes per se sex discrimination. For 
some courts, the application of the Supreme Court’s Title VII sex discrimination 
precedent to gender identity and expression is more straightforward than in the 
case of sexual orientation. For example, in Finkle v. Howard County,, the court 
held an employee’s allegations she was discriminated against “because of her 
obvious transgendered status” raised a cognizable claim of sex discrimination 
because: “it would seem that any discrimination against transsexuals (as 
transsexuals) - individuals who, by definition, do not conform to gender 
stereotypes - is proscribed by Title VII's proscription of discrimination on the basis 
of sex as interpreted by Price Waterhouse.”[28] Likewise, in Fabian v. Hospital of 
Central Connecticut, the court held that “[e]mployment discrimination on the 
basis of transgender identity is employment discrimination ‘because of sex’ and 
constitutes a violation of Title VII.”[29] In Smith v. City of Salem, the Sixth  Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender 
individuals based on gender stereotyping, stating:  
 




After Price Waterhouse, an employer who discriminates against women because, for 
instance, they do not wear dresses or makeup, is engaging in sex discrimination because 
the discrimination would not occur but for the victim's sex. It follows that employers who 
discriminate against men because they do wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act 
femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimination, because the discrimination would not 
occur but for the victim's sex.[30]  
The court rejected the argument that applying a label such as “transsexual,” 
“homosexual,” or “transvestite” to gender non-conforming behavior removes it 
from the protection of Title VII, explaining “discrimination against a plaintiff who 
is a transsexual - and therefore fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender - 
is no different from the discrimination directed against Ann Hopkins in Price 
Waterhouse, who, in sex-stereotypical terms, did not act like a woman.”[31]  
Other courts have refused to find that discrimination on the basis of gender 
identity or expression is per se discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes, but 
nevertheless endorsed application of Title VII to discrimination based on gender 
identity and expression. For example, in EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral 
Homes, Inc., the court stated, “[I]f the EEOC's complaint had alleged that the 
Funeral Home fired Stephens based solely upon Stephens's status as a transgender 
person, then this Court would agree with the Funeral Home that the EEOC's 
complaint fails to state a claim under Title VII.”[32] However, the court denied the 
employer’s motion to dismiss, noting that any person – without regard to labels 
such as transgender – can assert a sex-stereotyping gender-discrimination claim 
… if that person’s failure to conform to sex stereotypes was the driving force behind 
the termination.”[33]  
 EEOC Expands and Prosecutes LGBT Protections Under Title VII  
In 2012, the EEOC issued a decision overturning nearly 40 years of EEOC precedent that had 
rejected sex discrimination claims on the basis of gender identity.  In Macy v. Department of 
Justice, the EEOC held that discrimination on the basis of “gender identity, change of 
sex, and/or transgender status are [per se] cognizable under Title VII’s sex 
discrimination prohibition” and that “[a]lthough most courts have found 
protection for transgender people under Title VII under a theory of gender 
stereotyping, evidence of gender stereotyping is simply one means of proving sex 
discrimination.”[34] The EEOC followed Macy with Jameson v. U.S. Postal 
Service, where it held that the “[i]ntentional misuse of the [transgender] 
employee’s new name and pronoun may cause harm to the employee, and may 
constitute sex discrimination.”[35]  In Complainant v. Department of Veteran 
Affairs, the EEOC further held that an employer’s refusal to allow a transgender 
employee permission to change his username to his legally changed name states a 
valid Title VII claim.[36] Finally, in Lusardi v. Department of the Army, the EEOC 
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held that the employer’s decision to prevent a transgender woman’s access to the 
women’s restroom constitutes “direct evidence of discrimination on the basis of 
sex” and further held that “supervisory or co-worker confusion or anxiety cannot 
justify discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.”[37]   
In the 2015 decision Baldwin v. Department of Transportation, the EEOC also 
reversed its longstanding precedent and held that “sexual orientation is inherently 
a ‘sex-based consideration,’ and an allegation of discrimination based on sexual 
orientation is necessarily and allegation of sex discrimination under Title VII.”[38]  
Since Baldwin, the EEOC has reported a 28 percent increase in the number of 
LGBT charges filed in 2015[39] and has prosecuted several discrimination claims 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity, resulting in settlement 
agreements and consent decrees.[40]   
  Seventh Circuit Decisions 
Until recently, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals did  not favor finding that Title 
VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination protects the LGBT community.[41] In 
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,[42] Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care 
Ctr., Inc.,[43] Spearman v. Ford Motor Co.,[44] and Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk 
Products, Inc.,[45] the Seventh Circuit held that there is a distinction between  sex 
and sexuality under Title VII and that the statute only prohibits discrimination 
because of sex, meaning “biological male or biological female” and not sexual 
orientation. 
 However, in 2014, in Muhammad v. Caterpillar Inc., the Seventh Circuit appeared 
to signal a softening of its position regarding whether sexual orientation discrimination claims 
are cognizable under Title VII.[46] In Muhammad, the plaintiff alleged that hostile work 
environment harassment relating to his perceived sexual orientation was sex-
based harassment in violation of Title VII.  Although the Seventh Circuit affirmed 
the district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer, finding that the 
employer took prompt remedial action upon being notified of the harassment, the 
court amended its original decision after the plaintiff’s petition for rehearing and 
eliminated language that had stated that sexual orientation-related discrimination 
claims are not actionable under Title VII. 
In 2017, in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, the Seventh Circuit sitting en 
banc reversed its prior case law and held “that a person who alleges that she 
experienced employment discrimination on the basis of her sexual orientation has 
put forth a case of sex discrimination for Title VII purposes.”[47]  Hively was an 
open lesbian and a part-time adjunct professor who alleged that Ivy Tech refused 
to interview her for open full-time positions and subsequently failed to renew her 




contract, “based on my sexual orientation.”[48] The district court dismissed the 
case on the ground that the Title VII does not apply to claims of sexual orientation 
discrimination.[49]   
In an exhaustive decision involving an extensive discussion of Title VII case law, a 
Seventh Circuit panel affirmed, noting that “Congress has repeatedly rejected 
legislation that would have extended Title VII to cover sexual orientation … even 
in the face of an abundance of judicial opinions recognizing an emerging consensus 
that sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace can no longer be 
tolerated.”[50] The Court concluded that that, while “[i]t seems unlikely that our 
society can continue to condone a legal structure in which employees can be fired, 
harassed, demeaned, singled out for undesirable tasks, paid lower wages, demoted, 
passed over for promotions, and otherwise discriminated against solely based on 
who they date, love, or marry”, “[u]ntil the writing comes in the form of a Supreme 
Court opinion or new legislation, we must adhere to the writing of our prior 
precedent.”[51] 
On October 11, 2016, the Seventh Circuit granted the plaintiff’s petition for a 
rehearing en banc,[52] and, on March 30, 2017, a majority of the court reversed 
the panel’s decision.  First, the court reasoned that “the fact that the enacting 
Congress may not have anticipated a particular application of the law cannot stand 
in the way of the provisions of the law that are on the books.”[53]  In a concurring 
opinion, Judge Posner agreed that, because Title VII was more than half a century 
old, the majority properly engaged in “judicial interpretive updating”, which is 
necessary when “a lengthy interval between enactment and (re)interpretation” 
occurs such the court must engage in “interpretation that will update it to the 
present.”[54] 
Second, the court applied the “comparative method,”[55] and found that Hively 
had pleaded sex discrimination because “if she had been a man married to a 
woman (or living with a woman, or dating a woman) and everything else had stayed 
the same, Ivy Tech would not have refused to promote her and would not have fired 
her.”[56] The court further noted,, “Viewed through the lens of the gender 
nonconformity line of cases, Hively represents the ultimate case of failure to 
conform to the female stereotype (at least as understood in a place such as modern 
America, which views heterosexuality as the norm and other forms of sexuality as 
exceptional): she is not heterosexual.”[57]  The court eviscerated the requirement 
that LGBT plaintiffs characterize their claims as being based on gender 
stereotypes, stating that while “Our panel described the line between a gender 
nonconformity claim and one based on sexual orientation as gossamer-thin; we 
conclude that it does not exist at all.”[58]   
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Finally, the court held that an action based on sexual orientation is sex 
discrimination under the associational theory, which holds that a person who is 
discriminated against because of her association with someone else is actually 
disadvantaged because of her own traits.  The court cited Loving v. Virginia[59] as 
recognizing that “distinctions drawn according to race” are “unjustifiable and 
racially discriminatory.”[60]  The court held that if, instead of race, it was “to 
change the sex of one partner in a lesbian relationship, the outcome would be 
different”, revealing “that the discrimination rests on distinctions drawn according 
to sex.”[61]  The majority concluded that “It would require considerable 
calisthenics to remove the ‘sex’ from ‘sexual orientation’ and that “the common-
sense reality [is] that it is actually impossible to discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation without discriminating on the basis of sex.”[62]   
 Equality Act[63]   
In July 2015, Rep. Cicilline (D-RI) introduced H.R. 3185, the Equality Act, to 
amend Title VII to specifically include sexual orientation and gender identity as 
protected classifications. The Findings section of the Equality Act specifically notes 
that LGBT employees “have been subjected to a history and pattern of persistent, 
widespread, and pervasive discrimination on the bases of sexual orientation and 
gender identity by private sector employers and Federal, State, and local 
government employers,” and that “[t]he absence of explicit prohibitions of 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity under Federal 
statutory law, as well as some conflicting case law on how broadly sex 
discrimination provisions apply, has created uncertainty for employers and other 
entities covered by these laws.”[64]  The Equality Act was referred to the House 
Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice. 
B. The Equal Protection Clause and Section 1983   
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o 
state shall make or enforce any law which shall … deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”[65] Section 1983 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1871 creates a private right of action to remedy deprivations of federal rights 
(including the rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause) by those acting 
under the color of state law.[66]   
There are three levels of scrutiny that courts apply to Equal Protection claims: (1) 
strict scrutiny, which requires a regulation to be narrowly tailored to a compelling 
governmental interest; (2) intermediate scrutiny, which requires a regulation to be 
substantially related to an important governmental interest; and (3) rational basis 
review, which requires a regulation to be rationally related to a legitimate 




governmental interest.[67]  While courts apply strict scrutiny to decisions based on 
race and intermediate scrutiny to decisions based on gender, courts generally apply 
the lowest-level, rational basis review to decisions based on sexual orientation.[68]  
Courts have applied rational basis review to employment discrimination claims by 
LGBT public employees and concluded that discrimination and harassment on the 
basis of sexual orientation may violate the Equal Protection Clause.[69] In Quinn 
v. Nassau County Police Department, the plaintiff was a gay police officer who 
alleged he was subjected to a vicious campaign of harassment because of his sexual 
orientation.[70] The district court found that “the United States Constitution and 
the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, combined with logic, common sense and 
fairness dictate the answer: individuals have a constitutional right under the Equal 
Protection Clause to be free from sexual orientation discrimination causing a 
hostile work environment in public employment.”[71] In Lovell v. Comsewogue 
School District, the plaintiff was a 27-year art teacher.[72] Students filed a sexual 
harassment complaint against the plaintiff with the principal, but the principal 
failed to follow district policy by failing to inform the plaintiff about the complaint 
and by failing to allow the plaintiff to present facts during the investigation into 
the complaint.[73] The students then began to harass the plaintiff, using slurs 
based on her sexual orientation, and the principal took no remedial action against 
the students.[74] The district court denied the school district’s motion to dismiss, 
finding that “harassment based on sexual orientation is a basis for an equal 
protection claim under Section 1983.”[75] 
The Equal Protection Clause also protects public employees from discrimination 
on the basis of gender identity and expression. In Glenn v. Brumby, the plaintiff 
was transitioning from male to female under the supervision of health care 
providers.[76] While still presenting as a man, the plaintiff was hired as an editor 
by the Georgia General Assembly’s Office of Legislative Counsel.[77] The plaintiff 
subsequently informed her direct supervisor that she was transitioning to 
becoming a woman and started coming to work presenting as a woman.[78] The 
manager terminated the plaintiff because “[her] intended gender transition was 
inappropriate, that it would be disruptive, that some people would view it as a 
moral issue, and that it would make [her] coworkers uncomfortable.”[79]  The 
plaintiff brought a Section 1983 claim alleging unlawful discrimination in violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause.[80] The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied 
intermediate scrutiny and affirmed the district court’s granting of summary 
judgment to the plaintiff, concluding “that a government agent violates the Equal 
Protection Clause’s prohibition on sex-based discrimination when he or she fires a 
transgender or transsexual employee because of his or her gender non-
conformity.”[81] 
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C.  First Amendment 
Public employees have a First Amendment right to speak about sexual orientation 
and to “come out” publicly.[82]  In Van Ooteghem v. Gray,[83] the plaintiff was 
hired by the County Treasurer as Cashier Assistant County Treasurer and later 
promoted to Assistant County Treasurer.  He was a non-tenured employee, 
“performed his job in a professional manner” and was “recognized to be both hard-
working and quite brilliant.”[84]  Seven months after being hired, the plaintiff 
informed the County Treasurer that he was gay and that he intended to address the 
Commissioners Court on the subject of gay civil rights.[85]  The County Treasurer 
restricted the plaintiff’s work hours to prevent him from addressing the 
Commissioners Court and later terminated his employment.[86]  The Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s finding that the plaintiff’s First 
Amendment Right to speak about gay civil rights was violated.[87] 
In Weaver v. Nebo School District,[88] the plaintiff was a teacher with 19 years of 
service and volleyball coach with an excellent reputation and good to excellent 
evaluations.  While recruiting players for a summer volleyball camp, she was asked 
by one of the players if she was gay and the plaintiff responded truthfully, “yes.”[89]  
The team member said she would not play on the team and her parents informed 
the school district administrators that the plaintiff was gay.[90] The administrators 
decided that the plaintiff would not be the assigned volleyball coach and, in a letter, 
advised the plaintiff that “[y]ou are not to make any comments, announcements or 
statements to students, staff members, or parents of students regarding your 
homosexual orientation or lifestyle.”[91]  The plaintiff filed a First Amendment and 
Section 1983 action challenging the restraints on her speech and her removal as a 
volleyball coach.[92]  Applying the two-part test from Pickering v. Board of 
Education of Township High School District 205,[93] the district court granted 
summary judgment to the plaintiff on all her claims and determined that, although 
sexual orientation is “in essence” a private matter, the ongoing public debate 
regarding the rights of homosexuals made it a matter of public concern, and that 
the school system interests did not outweigh the plaintiff’s interests in expressing 
her sexual orientation outside the classroom.[94] 
Weaver was decided prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
which held that the First Amendment does not protect public employees’ 
statements made pursuant to their official duties.[95] Because the teacher 
expressed her sexual orientation while attempting to recruit students for the 
school’s volleyball team, her speech could be considered to have occurred pursuant 
to her duties as a teacher and coach. In Garcetti, however, there was no dispute the 
speech in question was made pursuant to the employee’s official duties and the 




Court noted it had “no occasion to articulate a comprehensive framework for 
defining the scope of an employee's duties in cases where there is room for serious 
debate.”[96]  The Court further rejected “the suggestion that employers can restrict 
employees' rights by creating excessively broad job descriptions.”[97] Accordingly, 
any First Amendment analysis under Weaver should be coupled with Garcetti and 
its progeny. 
In Scarbrough v. Morgan County Board of Education, the plaintiff was a former 
school superintendent who was asked to say a prayer at a convention breakfast 
hosted by a church with a predominantly gay congregation.[98] Although the 
plaintiff declined due to a scheduling conflict, a newspaper incorrectly reported 
that he would be a speaker at the convention.[99]  The plaintiff was subsequently 
denied the position of director of schools.[100]  The plaintiff sued for violations of 
his rights to freedom of speech and equal protection.[101]  Reversing the district 
court’s granting of summary judgment to the employer, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the plaintiff’s intended “speech concerned religion and perhaps 
homosexuality, and was to occur on his own free time … and there is precedent for 
recognizing that ‘certain private remarks … touch on matters of public 
concern.’”[102]  The Sixth Circuit applied rational basis scrutiny and held that 
“[t]he desire to effectuate one’s animus against homosexuals can never be a 
legitimate governmental purpose.”[103] 
 
D. Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)  
The FMLA entitles public employees, who must have at least 1,250 hours of service 
during the previous 12-month period,[104] to 12 weeks of unpaid leave to care for 
their own serious health condition or the serious health condition of the employee’s 
spouse, son, daughter, or parent.[105]  The FMLA’s definition of “spouse” includes 
same-sex marriage spouses.[106] In United States v. Windsor,[107] the U.S. 
Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional Section 3 of the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA), which defined the term “marriage” under federal law as 
“only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife,” and 
the word “spouse” as “only a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife.” 
The U.S. Department of Labor issued a Final Rule, effective March 27, 2015, 
defining “spouse” under the FMLA to guarantee employees in same–sex marriages 
full FMLA rights, regardless of whether their marriage is recognized in the state in 
which they reside, provided that the marriage is “recognized under state law for 
purposes of marriage in the State in which the marriage was entered into or, in the 
case of a marriage entered into outside of any State, if the marriage is valid in the 
place where entered into and could have been entered into in at least one 
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State.”[108] In Obergefell v. Hodges,[109] the U.S. Supreme Court struck down 
state statutes limiting marriage to heterosexual couples removing any doubt that 
employment-related benefits tied to marriage must apply equally to same-sex 
spouses.  
E. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990[110]   
The ADA prohibits discrimination against public employees on the basis of a 
“disability,” which means: a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities; a record of such impairment, or being 
regarding as having such impairment.[111]  However, despite recent enactment of 
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), the purpose of which was to make 
it easier for people with disabilities to obtain protection under the ADA,[112] the 
ADA specifically provides that the definition of “disability” does not include 
“[h]omosexuality and bisexuality” or “[t]ransvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, 
exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical 
impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders.”[113]   
In the 2014 lawsuit Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., transgender woman Kate Lynn 
Blatt, a stocker at Cabela’s who was prohibited from using the women’s restroom 
and was forced to wear a nametag depicting her name as “James,” even though she 
had a legal name change to her female name, claimed that the ADA’s exclusion of 
gender identity disorders from the definition of disability violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.[114]  The case is still pending. 
F. Health Care Taxability and Non-Discrimination 
The cost of gender transition medical expenses may be tax deductible.  In 
O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the U.S. Tax Court held that 
a transgender woman who was diagnosed with gender identity disorder was 
permitted to deduct the cost of her gender transition therapy and surgeries, 
including transportation and other related expenses, as a medical expenses 
deduction under the Internal Revenue Code.[115]  The Tax Court held that gender 
identity disorder was a “disease” within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code 
and that the therapy and procedures were for the treatment of the disease and not 
cosmetic surgery (except for her breast augmentation surgery, which the Court 
found was cosmetic surgery).[116] 
Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act prohibits discrimination in health care 
participation and benefits on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age or 
disability, as defined in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 




of 1975, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.[117]  Effective July 18, 
2016, the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (HHS), Office for Civil 
Rights (“OCR”), which enforces the non-discrimination provision, issued a final 
rule that includes gender identity in the definition of “sex” as a protected 
classification.[118] 
The final rule mandates equal access to health programs and that individuals be 
treated “consistent with their gender identity,”[119] and prohibits denying or 
limiting coverage, or imposing additional cost sharing or other limitations or 
restrictions, “for any health services that are ordinarily or exclusively available to 
individuals of one sex, or a transgender individual based on the fact that an 
individual’s sex assigned at birth, gender identity, or gender otherwise recorded is 
different from the one to which such health services are ordinarily or exclusively 
available.”[120] 
Although the final rule does not specifically include sexual orientation in the 
definition of sex, the OCR concluded that “Section 1557’s prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of sex includes, at a minimum, sex discrimination 
related to an individual’s sexual orientation where the evidence establishes that the 
discrimination is based on gender stereotypes.”[121]  OCR further noted that it 
“has decided not to resolve in this rule whether discrimination on the basis of an 
individual’s sexual orientation status alone is a form of sex discrimination under 
Section 1557” and that it “will enforce Section 1557 in light of those developments 
[in case law] and will consider issuing further guidance on this subject as 
appropriate.”[122] 
In Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, several states and religiously affiliated 
health care organizations sued HHS claiming that the final rule violates, inter alia, 
the Administrative Procedures Act by expanding the definition of “sex” to include 
“gender identity.”[123]  On December 31, 2016, the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas issued a nationwide preliminary injunction prohibiting 
HHS from enforcing Section 1557’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis 
of gender identity.[124]  
G. LGBT Protections Under Illinois Law 
The Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) protects public employees from 
employment discrimination on the basis of “sexual orientation,” which “means 
actual or perceived heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, or gender-related 
identity, whether or not traditionally associated with the person’s designated sex 
at birth.”[125]  Although the IHRA does not provide for punitive damages, it does 
provide for “make whole” relief, including actual damages, interest, back pay, front 
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pay, and emotional distress.[126]   The IHRA established two administrative 
agencies: the Illinois Department of Human Rights (“Department”) and the Illinois 
Human Rights Commission (“Commission”).  The Department is responsible for 
issuing, receiving, investigating, conciliating, and dismissing charges of 
discrimination and filing complaints of discrimination.[127] The Commission is 
responsible for hearing and deciding complaints, issuing decisions, and approving 
settlements proposed by the Department.[128] 
 In Sommerville v. Hobby Lobby Stores, the Commission recently affirmed a 
decision of one of its Administrative Law Judges finding that an employer 
discriminated against a transgender employee.[129] On February 28, 2013, 
Meggan Sommerville filed two charges of discrimination against Hobby Lobby 
Stores, alleging discrimination in employment and public accommodation on the 
basis of sexual orientation discrimination related to her gender identity.  Hobby 
Lobby’s restrooms are designated by gender and are used by both employees and 
the public.  Hobby Lobby hired Sommerville in 1998 and, in 2007, Sommerville 
began a transition from male to female that included medical treatment, having 
her name legally changed, and obtaining a driver’s license identifying her has 
female and a social security card with her female name.  In 2010, Sommerville 
informed the store manager that she intended to use the women’s restroom.  
Hobby Lobby refused to let her use the women’s restroom and disciplined her for 
doing so, unless she received anatomical surgery.  Although Hobby Lobby built a 
“unisex” restroom for her to use, Sommerville used the women’s restroom at a 
nearby business.[130] 
On May 15, 2015, a Commission Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued a 
recommended liability determination and found that Hobby Lobby violated the 
IHRA because its decision forbidding Sommerville access to and use of its women’s 
restroom was motivated by her gender-related identity.  The ALJ held that the 
IHRA does not make any anatomical surgery a prerequisite to obtain gender-
related identity protection.[131]  The ALJ further found that “a co-worker’s 
discomfort cannot justify discriminatory terms and conditions of employment” 
and that the “prejudices of co-workers are part of what the Act was meant to 
prevent.”[132]  Finally, the ALJ found that Hobby Lobby’s “segregation of 
[Sommerville] to a ‘unisex’ restroom is an adverse act and subjects her to different 
terms and conditions than similarly situated non-transgender employees.”[133]  
 
On February 2, 2016, the ALJ issued a recommended order and decision on 
damages ordering: 
 




 Hobby Lobby to cease and desist from gender identity discrimination and allow 
Sommerville access to its women’s restroom. 
 All Hobby Lobby’s managers in Illinois to attend sensitivity training on gender 
identity discrimination. 
 Any of Hobby Lobby’s public contracts to be terminated and Hobby Lobby to be 
barred from participating in any public contract for three years. 
 Hobby Lobby to pay Sommerville $298 in costs and out of pocket expenses, 
$220,000 for emotional distress, and $97,000 in attorney’s fees.[134] 
On November 2, 2016,[135] the Commission adopted the ALJ’s recommended 
determination with respect to liability.  As to damages, the Commission declined 
to adopt the ALJ’s recommendation that Hobby Lobby’s managers attend 
statewide sensitivity training and that Hobby Lobby be barred from participating 
in public contracts for three years.[136]  The Commission  remanded the emotional 
distress damages awarded to the ALJ for further articulation of the evidentiary 
basis for the amount.[137]  The Commission adopted all remaining aspects of the 
ALJ’s decision and has yet to issue a formal decision.[138] 
H. LGBT Protections Under Other State Statutes And Executive Orders 
Thirty-one other states and the District of Columbia offer various protections for 
LGBT public employees by way of state statutes and executive orders.  Legislation 
protects public employees on the basis of both sexual orientation and gender 
identity in the following states and the District of Columbia: California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and Washington.[139]  New Hampshire and 
Wisconsin have state statutes that protect public employees from employment 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, but not gender identity.[140] 
Executive orders protect state employees against discrimination on the basis of 
both sexual orientation and gender identity in the following states: Indiana, 
Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.[141]  Executive orders 
protect state employees against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 
but not gender identity, in the following states: Alaska, Arizona, Missouri, and 
Ohio.[142] State employees covered by these executive orders should beware that 
some orders are mere statements of policy and may not provide for any claims to 
be filed or relief to be obtained. 
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Three states – Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee – have laws that actively 
prevent the passage or enforcement of nondiscrimination laws on the basis of 
sexual orientation or gender identity.[143] 
III. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: A RIPE OPPORTUNITY TO EFFECT 
CHANGE 
 
Collective bargaining presents an opportunity to effect positive change where 
federal, state, and local governments have been unable to do so, as the parties can 
bargain for LGBT non-discrimination protections for public employees.  Non-
discrimination clauses are likely mandatory subjects of bargaining under the 
National Labor Relations Act.[144] Non-discrimination provisions protect 
employees from discriminatory employer adverse actions that affect their terms 
and conditions of employment, and from unions that discriminate in representing 
employees. Bargained-for non-discrimination provisions also lay the groundwork 
for employers and unions to push back against state and local laws that would 
discriminate against employees because such discrimination would violate the 
collective bargaining agreement.   
 
The following is sample LGBT-inclusive non-discrimination language: 
 
There shall be no discrimination against any employee with respect to compensation, 
terms, conditions privileges of or opportunities for employment because of race, color, 
religion, sex, (including pregnancy), gender, gender identity, gender expression, veteran 
status, medical condition (including genetic characteristics), sexual orientation, age, 
national origin, disability as defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act, linguistic 
characteristics (such as accent or limited English proficiency, where not substantially job-
related), marital status or any other basis prohibited by law.[145] 
Although not a public employment relationship, professional and NCAA sports 
provide an example as to how collective bargaining can effect positive change for 
the LGBT community.  The Major League Baseball[146], National Football 
League[147], National Basketball Association[148], Major League Soccer[149], 
and National Hockey League[150] collective bargaining agreements all prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, although none of these collective 
bargaining agreements prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity or 
gender expression.  In 2016, the NBA relocated the 2017 All-Star Game from 
Charlotte as a result of North Carolina House Bill 2, which was signed into law on 
March 23, 2016, and mandated that multiple occupancy restrooms and changing 
facilities be used only by individuals based on their biological sex[151], stating that 




the All-Star Game “is intended to be a global celebration of basketball, our league, 
and the values for which we stand, and … we do not believe we can successfully 
host our All-Star festivities in Charlotte in the climate created by HB2.”[152]  
While it is unsettled whether National Collegiate Athletic Association players who 
receive grant-in-aid scholarships are statutory employees under the National 
Labor Relations Act,[153] the NCAA has taken steps outside of the collective 
bargaining process to effect positive change for the LGBT community.  In April 
2016, the NCAA Board of Directors approved an anti-discrimination process for 
bidding on all NCAA events, from the Final Four to educational conferences, 
stating that it “considers the promotion of inclusiveness in … sexual orientation 
and gender identity as a vital element to protecting the well-being of student-
athletes, promoting diversity in hiring practices and creating a culture of 
fairness.”[154] On September 12, 2016, the NCAA announced that it was relocating 
all seven previously awarded championship events from North Carolina during the 
2016-2017 academic year “because of the cumulative actions taken by the state 
concerning civil rights protections.”[155]  On March 20, 2017, in response to the 
pressure from the NBA and the NCAA, North Carolina repealed House Bill 2 and 
the mandate that multiple occupancy restrooms and changing facilities be used 
only by individuals based on their biological sex; however, North Carolina still 
prohibits local governments and the University of North Carolina, from regulating 
access to multiple occupancy restrooms or changing facilities until December 1, 
2020.[156]  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite alarming rates of discrimination, unemployment, and poverty, no federal 
laws explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender 
identity.  While various courts and the EEOC have interpreted Title VII’s 
prohibition on sex discrimination to cover LGBT discrimination, many of those 
decisions do not cover such discrimination per se, but rather, cover it only to the 
extent discrimination against LGBT employees can be made to fit the framework 
of gender stereotype discrimination. In some circumstances, such as when 
transgender employees experience discrimination because they do not conform 
with stereotypes associated with their gender assigned at birth, the gender 
stereotype framework may clearly apply. In other cases, the gender stereotype 
paradigm cannot be made to fit discrimination against LGBT employees, leaving 
them without a remedy.  Until this gap is filled by either the U.S. Supreme Court 
or legislative amendment such as the Equality Act, protections will not be complete 
under federal law for LGBT employees.  While public employees can look to a 
patchwork of other federal laws and state laws and executive orders for protection, 
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those protections are often insufficient and incomplete.  Collective bargaining 
presents an opportunity for labor unions and public employers to fill these gaps 
and bargain for protections for LGBT employees that do not exist under federal 
and state law. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
[1] Brad Sears & Christy Mallory, Employment Discrimination Against LGBT People: Existence 
and Impact, in GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: 
A PRACTICAL GUIDE  ch. 40, at 40-3 (Christine Michelle Duffy ed. 3024) (reporting on 2008 
General Social Survey), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/up 
loads/CH40- Discrimination-Against-LGBT-People-Sears-Mallory.pdf . 
[2] SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, THE REPORT OF THE 
2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 148 (2016), available at http://www.transequality.org/ 
sites/default/files/docs/USTS-Full-Report-FINAL.PDF. 
[3] Id. at 151. 
[4] Id. at 140.  
[5] Id. at 140-141. 
[6] Id. at 152. 
[7] See JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 180-81 (National Center for Transgender Equality and 
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, 2011), available at http://www.transequality.org/ 
sites/default/files/docs/resources/NTDS_Report.pdf. 
[8] Adapted from: GLAAD MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, AN ALLY’S GUIDE TO 
TERMINOLOGY: TALKING ABOUT LGBT PEOPLE & EQUALITY (2012), available at http://www.glaad. 
org/sites/default/files/allys-guide-to-terminology_1.pdf; Glossary of Terms, Human Rights 
Campaign, http://www.hrc.org/resources/glossary-of-terms. (last visited Apr. 7, 2017). 
[9] 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1). 
[10] 42 U.S.C. §2000e(b). 
[11] 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
[12] 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
[13] Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 235. 
[14] Id. at 251 (emphasis added). 
[15] Id. at 250. 
[16] Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82. 
[17] Id. at 79-80. 
[18] 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224 (D. Or. 2002). 
[19] Terveer v. Billington, 34 F. Supp. 3d 100, 116 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2014); see also Boutillier v. 
Hartford Public Schools, 2014 U.S. Dist LEXIS 134919 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2014) (denying 
employer's motion to dismiss a Title VII sex discrimination claim the plaintiff’s allegation that 
she was "subjected to sexual stereotyping during her employment on the basis of her sexual 
orientation" sets forth "a plausible claim that she was discriminated against based on her non-
conforming gender behavior.") 
[20] Koren v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 14, 2012). 
[21] See Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Simonton v. 
Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000)). 




[22] 731 F.3d 444, 449-451 (5th Cir. 2013). 
[23] Id. at 455 n.5 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) 
(altercation in original). 
[24] 167 F. Supp. 3d 598, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
[25] Id. at 621-22. 
[26] Id. at 622. 
[27] See Schroer v. Billington, 77 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008). 
[28] 12 F. Supp. 3d 780, 788 (D. Md. 2014). 
[29] 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 527 (D. Conn. 2016). 
[30] 378 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 733 
(6th Cir. 2005) (holding that plaintiff, who "was a male-to-female transsexual who was living as 
a male while on duty but often lived as a woman off duty [and] had a reputation throughout the 
police department as a homosexual, bisexual or cross-dresser," stated a claim for sex 
discrimination by alleging he was demoted because of his failure to conform to sex stereotypes). 
[31] Smith, 378 F.3d at 575. 
[32] 100 F. Supp. 3d 594, (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2015). 
[33] Id. at 595; see also Lewis v. High Point Regional Health Sys., 79 F. Supp. 3d 588 (E.D.N.C. 
2015) (denying employer’s motion to dismiss claim by transgender employee because the 
employer had only argued that sexual orientation was not covered under Title VII and sexual 
orientation and gender identity are two distinct concepts.) 
[34] Macy v Dep’t of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 at *10 (Apr. 20, 
2012). 
[35]  Jameson v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120130992, 2013 WL 2368729  at *2 (May 
21, 2013). 
[36]  Complainant v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133123, 2014 WL 1653484 
(Apr. 16, 2014). 
[37]  Lusardi v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133395, 2015 WL 1607756 at *9 (Mar. 27, 
2015). 
[38] Baldwin v. Dep’t of Transp., EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 at *5 (July 
15, 2015). 
[39] U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, What You Should Know About EEOC 
and the Enforcement Protections for LGBT Workers, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom 
/wysk/enforcement_protections_lgbt_workers.cfm#charges (last visited Apr. 7, 2017). 
[40] EEOC v. Lakeland Eye Clinic, P.A., M.D. Fla., Civ. No. 8:14-cv-2421-T35 AEP, filed Sept. 
25, 2014, settled April 9, 2015; EEOC v. Deluxe Financial Services Corp., (D. Minn., Civ. No. 
0:15-cv-02646-ADM-SER, filed June 4, 2015, settled January 20, 2016); EEOC v. Pallet Cos. 
d/b/a IFCO Sys. North Am., Inc. (hereinafter "IFCO"), (D. Md., Civ. No. 1:16-cv-00595-CCB, 
filed Mar. 1, 2016, settled June 28, 2016); EEOC v. Scott Med. Health Ctr., P.C., 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 153744 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2016); EEOC v. Bojangles Restaurants, Inc., (E.D. N.C., Civ. 
No. 5:16-cv-00654-BO, filed July 6, 2016). For further reading, see U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, Fact Sheet: Recent EEOC Litigation Regarding Title VII & LGBT-
Related Discrimination. https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigation/selected/lgbt_facts.cfm. (last 
visited Apr.7, 2017). 
[41] Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., (citing Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 
Inc.,). 
[42] 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). 
[43] 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000). 
24 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT SPRING 2017 
[44] 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000). 
[45] 332 F.3d 1058 (7th Cir. 2003). 
[46] 767 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2014). 
[47] Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 351-52 (7th Cir.  2017). 
[48] Id. at 341. 
[49] Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., No. 3:14-cv-1791, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25813, at *2 (N.D. 
Ind. Mar. 3, 2015).  
[50] Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., , 830 F.3d 698,701-02 (7th Cir. 2016). 
[51] Id. at 718. 
[52] Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. College, No. 15-1720, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 20302, at *1 (7th Cir. 
Oct. 11, 2016). 
[53] Hively, 853 F.3d  at 345. 
[54] Id. at 353. 
[55] Id. at 345. 
[56] Id.  
[57] Id. at 346. 
[58] Id. 
[59] 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
[60] Hively, 853 F.3d at 348. 
[61] Id. at 349 
[62] Id. at 350. 
[63] H.R.3185 – Equality Act, 114th Congress (2015-16), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-
congress/house-bill/3185. (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
[64] Id. 
[65] United States Const. Amend. 14. 
[66] 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
[67] See e.g. Daly v. DelPonte, 624 A.2d 876, 883 (Conn. 2004) (identifying three levels of 
scrutiny for equal protection purposes). 
[68] Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-635 (1996); see also Quinn v. Nassau County Police 
Dept., 53 F. Supp. 2d 347, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (collecting cases). 
[69] Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-635 (1996). 
[70] 53 F. Supp. 2d 347 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
[71] Id. at 350. 
[72] 214 F. Supp. 2d 319 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
[73] Id. at 321. 
[74] Id.  
[75] Id. at 323; see also Martin v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 224 F. Supp. 2d 434 (N.D.N.Y. 
2002) (recognizing that creation of a hostile working environment based on an employee’s 
sexual orientation may violate the Equal Protection clause but dismissing claim by corrections 
officer because there was no evidence the plaintiff ever complained to the employer about such 
conduct). 
[76] 663 F.3d 1312 1314 (11th Cir. 2011). 
[77] Id.  
[78] Id.  
[79] Id.  
[80] Id.  
[81] Id. at 1317-20.  




[82] See Lamda Legal, The Rights of LGBT Public Employees, http://www.lambdalegal. 
org/publications/the-rights-of-lgbt-public-employees. (last visited Apr. 7, 2017). 
[83] 774 F.2d 1332, 1333-1334 (5th Cir. 1985). 
[84] Id. at 1333. 
[85] Id. 
[86] Id. at 1333-34. 
[87] Id. at 1334. 
[88] 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1280 (D. Utah 1998). 
[89] Id. at 1281. 
[90] Id. 
[91] Id. 
[92] Id. at 1282. 
[93] 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
[94] Id. at 1286, 1289-91. 
[95] Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
[96] Id. at 424. 
[97] Id. 
[98] 470 F.3d 250, 253 (6th Cir. 2006). 
[99] Id. at 253-54. 
[100] Id. at 254. 
[101] Id. 
[102] Id. at 257. 
[103] Id. at 261. 
[104] 29 U.S.C. §2611(2). 
[105] 29 U.S.C. §2612(a)(1)(C). 
[106] 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.102, 825.122(b). 
[107] 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013). 
[108] 80 Fed. Reg., 9989-99 (February 25, 2015); 29 C.F.R. §825.102. 
[109] 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
[110] 42 U.S.C. §12101. 
[111] Id. §12102(1). 
[112] Pub. L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008); 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)-(b). 
[113] Id., §12211(a), (b)(1). 
[114] Case No. 14-cv-04822-JFL (E.D. Penn.) 
[115] 134 T.C. 4 (2010). 
[116] Id. at 60, 73. 
[117] 42 U.S.C. §18116(a). 
[118] 45 C.F.R. §92.4. 
[119] 45 C.F.R. §§92.206. 
[120] Id. § 92.207(b)(3). 
[121] Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31390 (May 18, 2016). 
[122] Id. 
[123] No. 7:16-cv-00108-O, 2016 WL 7638311 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 31, 2016). 
[124] Id. 
[125] 775 ILCS 5/1-103(O-1). 
[126] 775 ILCS 5/8A-104(B), (G), (J). 
[127] 775 ILCS 5/7-101. 
26 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT SPRING 2017 
[128] 775 ILCS 5/8-102. 
[129] Charge Nos. 2011CN2993, 2011CP2994, ALS No. 13-0060C (Illinois Human Rights 
Commission). 
[130] Sommerville v. Hobby Lobby Stores, IHRC ALS No. 13-0060C (IHRC ALJ May 15, 2015), 
slip. op. at 1 – 3. 
[131] Id. at 8. 
[132] Id. at 11. 
[133] Id. 
[134] Sommerville v. Hobby Lobby Stores, IHRC ALS No. 13-0060C (IHRC ALJ Feb. 2, 2016), 
slip. op. at 15-16. 
[135] State of Ill., Human Rights Comm’on Minutes of Meeting of Panel C, November 2, 2016, 
https://www.illinois.gov/ihrc/Documents/D%2020161102%20Panel%20C%20Minutes.pdf 




[139] See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 12940; C.R.S. 24-34-402; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60; DEL. CODE. 
ANN. tit. 19, § 711; D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11; HAW. REV. STAT. §378-2; IOWA CODE §216.6; ME. REV. 
STAT. tit. 5, § 4572; MD. CODE. ANN. § 20-606; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, §4; MINN. STAT. § 
363A.08; NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.330; N.J. STAT. §10:5-12; N.M. STAT. ANN. §28-1-7; N.Y. EXEC. 
LAW § 296; OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030; R.I. GEN. LAWS §28-5-7; UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-106; VT. 
STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, §495; WASH. REV. CODE §49-60-180. 
[140] N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7; WIS. STAT. §111.321, 111.322, 111.36. 
[141] Ind. Governor’s Policy Statement (Ap.l 26, 2005); Ky. Exe. Order 2008-473 June. 2, 2008); 
Mich. Exec.e Directive 2007-24 (Nov. 11, 2007); Mont. Exec. Order No. 04-2016 9Jan. 18, 2016); 
Mont. Admin. R. 2.21.4005 (Oct. 16, 2016); Pa. Exec. Order 2016-04 (Apr. 7, 2016); Va. Exec. 
Order No. 1 (2014). 
[142] Alaska Admin. Order 195 (Mar. 5, 2002); Ariz. Exec. Order 2003-22 (June 21, 2003); Mo. 
Exec. Order 10-24 (July 9, 2010); Ohio Exec. Order 2011-05K (Jan. 21. 2011).  
[143] ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-1-403; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2; TENN. CODE ANN. §7-51-1802.  
[144] See Star Tribune, 295 NLRB 543, 548 (1989) (citing Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition 
Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975)). 
[145] Shellea Allen et al., It’s Time to Stand Up and Fight Back, AFLCIO.ORG (Nov. 9, 2015), 
http://www.aflcio.org/Blog/Organizing-Bargaining/It-s-Time-to-Stand-Up-and-Fight-Back. 
[146] Major League Clubs and MLB Players Ass’n 2012-2016 CBA, http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/ 
cba_english.pdf. (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). 
[147] NFL and NFL Players Ass’n 2011-2020 CBA, https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/ 
2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf. (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). 
[148] NBA and NBA Players Ass’n 2011-2021 CBA, http://nbpa.com/cba/. (last visited Mar. 3, 
2017). 
[149] MLS and MLS Players Union 2015-2020 CBA, https://www.mlsplayers.org/ 
images/Collective %20Bargaining%20Agreement%20-%20February%201,%202015.pdf. (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2017). 
[150] NHL and HNL Players Ass’n 2012-2022 CBA, http://www.nhlpa.com/inside-
nhlpa/collective-bargaining-agreement. (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). 
[151] N.C.S.L 2016-3. 




[152] See NBA statement regarding 2017 NBA All-Star Game, NBA.com (July 21, 2016), 
http://pr.nba.com/nba-statement-2017-nba-all-star-game-charlotte/. 
[153] Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (2015). 
[154] See Brian Hendrickson, Board of Governors Approves Anti-Discrimination Process for 
Championship Bids, NCCC.ORG (Apr. 27, 2016, 9:40 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/reso 
urces/media-center/news/board-governors-approves-anti-discrimination-process-
championships-bids. 
[155] See NCAA to Relocate Championships from North Carolina for 2016-17, NCAA.COM (Sept. 
12, 2016,7:22 PM), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2016-09-12/ncaa-relocate-cham 
pionships-north-carolina-2016-17.  
[156] N.C.S.L 2017-4. 
28 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT SPRING 2017 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
By the Student Editors 
Recent Development is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee Relations 
Report.  It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public 
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the 
public employee collective bargaining statutes and the equal employment 
opportunity laws. 
I. IELRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Protected Activity 
In Moraine Valley Community College v. IELRB, 2017 IL App (1st) 152845-U, the 
First District Appellate Court affirmed the IELRB’s finding that Morraine Valley 
Community College violated sections 14(a)(3) and 14(a)(1) of the IELRA by 
terminating Robin Meade, the local union president after she wrote a letter stating 
that the College was not innovative toward adjunct faculty and that adjunct faculty 
did not receive adequate wages, health benefits, and work schedules. 
The College was a member of the League for Innovation in Community College, a 
consortium promoting excellence and innovation in community colleges.  When 
the college replaced its president, it had to reapply for membership in the league.  
Meade was employed by the college as an adjunct faculty member since 2003. On 
August 20, 2013, Meade sent a letter to the league, stating that adjunct faculty did 
not receive adequate wages, health benefits, and work schedules. As a result of this 
letter, the college terminated Meade on the ground that her letter “went far beyond 
responsible advocacy” and “was a personal attempt to falsely discrediut” the 
college and “undermine its relationship with the [l]eague.” Consequently, the 
Union filed an unfair practice charge. The IELRB decided that the college violated 
sections 14(a)(3) and 14(a)(1) and the college appealed.  
Section 14(a)(1) prohibits educational employers from taking adverse action 
against an employee as a result of protected concerted activity; section 14(a)(3) 
prohibits discrimination based on union activity. To establish a prima facie case 
of a section 14(a)(3) violation, the Union must prove that: 1) the employee was 
engaged in activity protected by section 14(a)(3); 2) the employer was aware of that 
activity; and 3) the employer took adverse action against the employee for engaging 
in that activity. 
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In addition, attempts by employees and labor organizations to enlist the aid of 
third parties or the public fall under the protection of the IELRA, as long as: 1) the 
communications clearly indicate the existence of a labor dispute with the 
employer; and 2) the critical statements are not maliciously untrue. Additionally, 
the communication must constitute a concerted activity, which must be for the 
purpose of inducing or preparing for action on behalf of the group to correct a 
grievance or complaint. 
The dispute in this case only concerned whether Meade engaged in protected 
activity. The court held that Meade’s communication qualified as a concerted 
activity, which was protected by the Act. First, her letter discussed the issues 
experienced by the adjunct faculty as a group. Second, the matters raised in the 
letter concerned the adjunct faculty’s wages, benefits and hours, as well as the 
claim that the college reduced adjunct faculty hours to avoid providing health care 
benefits under the Affordable Care Act. These facts demonstrated the college and 
the union were engaged in labor dispute at the time of the letter.  
The court found that the critical statements included in the letter were not so 
maliciously untrue as to lose the protection under the IELRA. In the current case, 
there was nothing in the record to demonstrate that Meade’s letter was maliciously 
untrue or made with the knowledge that its contents were false or with reckless 
disregard for their truth of falsity. Therefore, the court held the IELRB’s decision 
was not clearly erroneous and affirmed.  
In AFSCME Council 31 and Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 
Respondent, 33 PERI ¶ 93 (IELRB 2017), the IELRB reversed a recommended 
decision of its ALJ which had found that the university had violated sections 
14(a)(5) and 14(a)(1) of the IELRA by unilaterally replacing bargaining unit 
account technicians (ATs) with non-bargaining unit business administrative 
associates (BAAs). The IELRB held that the unfair labor practice charge was 
untimely. 
April Moore negotiated and signed the 2011-2014 collective bargaining agreement 
(CBA) between the union and the university as a union bargaining team member. 
She was also a union steward from 2011 or 2012 to February or March 2014, and a 
member of the union’s executive board until January 2014. Moore knew that BAAs 
performed the same work as ATs since December 2012 because some BAAs talked 
about their work with her at that time.  
On December 18, 2012, the Union signed the CBA, which contains the following 
language: “During the course of negotiations, the Union expressed concern that 
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the University is seeking to erode the bargaining unit by purportedly assigning 
bargaining unit work to non-bargaining unit personnel. . . . “ 
On February 25, 2015, the union filed the unfair labor practice charge in this case.  
The IELRB observed that under section 15 of the IELRA, it does not have 
jurisdiction over unfair labor practice charges filed more than six months after the 
charging party knew or should have known of the actions which allegedly 
constitute the unfair labor practice. In this case, at least as early as December 10, 
2012, Moore knew that BAA was working in the same work area as the AT at the 
university.  
The IELRB held that Moore acted as the union’s agent since 2011. An individual is 
an agent of a party when he or she has actual or apparent authority to act on that 
party’s behalf; and apparent authority exists when a party has created a reasonable 
impression that an individual is acting as its agent. In addition, the union stewards 
have consistently been regarded as agents of the union that they represent. In this 
case, Moore served as a steward from approximately 2011 or 2012 until February 
or March 2014. Moreover, she also negotiated and signed the CBA as a union 
bargaining team member. Therefore, the IELRB regarded Moore as the union’s 
agent.  
Moore’s knowledge that BAAs did the same work as ATs since at least as early as 
December 10, 2012 could be imputed to the union because the law of agency in 
Illinois holds that the knowledge of an agent, acting within the scope and extent of 
his or her authority, is attributable to his or her principal. Therefore, the union 
knew or should have known the alleged violation since at least as early as 
December 10, 2012. However, the union filed the unfair labor practice charge on 
February 25, 2015; therefore, the charge was untimely regarding the University’s 
actions of which the Union knew or should have known before August 25, 2014.  
IELRB Member Sered dissented.  She maintained that although Moore had 
observed BAAs performing TA work, there was no evidence that she knew the 
university intended to have the work performed exclusively by BAAs until the 
summer of 2014 and by that time she had ceased to be an agent of the union.  
Member Sered observed that the language in the CBA merely stated the union’s 
suspicions that the university was eroding the bargaining unit and such suspicions 
did not constitute unequivocal notice of the alleged unfair labor practice.  Member 
Sered would have upheld the ALJ’s finding that the charge was timely. 
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II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Duty to Bargain 
 In International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 700 v. ILRB, 2017 Ill App (1st) 
152993, the First District Appellate Court reversed the ILRB Local Panel’s 
dismissal of an unfair labor practice charge over the employer’s enactment on one 
new work rule but affirmed the Panel’s dismissal of the charge regarding a second 
new work rule.   
The union filed unfair labor practice charges over the announcement of two new 
employment rules: the “Gang Order” and the “Rules of Conduct Order.”  The ALJ 
held that the employer, Cook County Department of Corrections (“CDOC”), had 
committed an unfair labor practice by unilaterally implementing the new rules.  
The Local Panel reversed, and the union appealed.   The Gang Order imposed a 
new requirement on the CDOC employees: filling out a disclosure form regarding 
the known or suspected gang affiliations of family members, friends, and several 
other classes of acquaintances.  The employer claimed that, because of the grave 
danger gang activity poses to the public in the Chicago area these days, this rule 
was necessary for the safety of the corrections officers, the inmates, and the general 
public.  However, the union urged that the requirements were overly burdensome, 
requiring employees in some cases to investigate their own family members.  The 
Rules of Conduct Order included a provision expanding the reach of discipline for 
on and off duty conduct to “any internet activity” including “electronic social media 
and networking sites.”  The union argued that this language was overly broad and 
chilled employees’ rights under the IPLRA to engage in concerted activity.  The 
employer asserted that this did not change the nature of the activities the 
employees were allowed to engage in, but only clarified where they could or could 
not engage in those activities.  Given that the parties were involved in negotiations 
at the time the orders were announced, an opportunity for meaningful bargaining 
over both orders was certainly available. 
 Applying the balancing test established in Central City Education Ass’n v. 
IELRB, 149 Ill. 2d 496, 599 N.E>2d 892 (1992), the court held that because the 
Gang Order could result in discipline against the employees, the benefits of 
bargaining outweighed the burden on the department’s inherent managerial 
authority to create safety rules.  Illinois precedent had not yet considered the 
lawfulness of simply creating a rule, as opposed to enforcing that rule, without 
bargaining.  Looking at precedent under the National Labor Relations Act and 
other jurisdictions with similar labor laws, the court held that creating this rule 
was enough to be an unfair labor practice.  However, the court upheld the Local 
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Panel’s finding as to the Rules of Conduct order, looking at NLRA precedent to 
hold that, without a challenge to the chilling effect of the rules of conduct in 
general, the social media/internet policy by itself could not be reasonably 
construed to interfere with employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted 
activity. 
In State of Illinois v. AFSCME Council 31, 2017 IL App (4th) 160827, the Fourth 
District Appellate Court stayed the decision of the ILRB State Panel which had 
found that the State of Illinois and AFSCME Council 31 had reached impasse over 
a single critical issue in their negotiations for a successor to the collective 
bargaining agreement that expired on June 30, 2015.  An ALJ had found that the 
State had violated section 10(a)(4) when it failed to provide AFSCME information 
relevant to such issues as wages and health insurance.  But the ALJ also found that 
the parties had bargained to impasse on subcontracting and other issues.  The ALJ 
ordered the parties to resume bargaining on those issues on which she found that 
they were not at impasse and on wages and health insurance because any impasse 
was not legitimate due to the State’s failure to provide requested information.  
However, she allowed the State to unilaterally implement its final offer with 
respect to those issues on which she found the parties to be at impasse. 
The State Panel affirmed the ALF’s findings with respect to the State’s failure to 
provide information but held that the State had not breached its duty to bargain 
when it broke off negotiations and declared impasse in January 2016 because they 
parties had reached impasse over subcontracting which was a single critical issue 
in their negotiations.  AFSCME appealed to the First District Appellate Court which 
granted AFSCME’s motion to stay the ILRB’s decision.  The State appealed to the 
Fourth District Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court consolidated that 
cases in the Fourth District. 
The Fourth District granted AFSCME’s renewed request for a stay.  The court cited 
section 3-111(a)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(1), which 
provides that a stay of the ILRB’s decision should be granted only if the union 
shows, among other things, “a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.” See 
Ill. S. Ct. R. 335(i)(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). The court stated that the question of 
whether the parties had arrived at an impasse was a question of fact. Thus, the 
court held that the ILRB’s finding of an impasse would be upheld unless it was 
“clearly evident” from the record that the parties were not at an impasse.  
Ultimately, the Fourth District determined that the union raised a “fair question” 
as to whether the ILRB properly invoked the private sector’s single critical issue 
exception to the requirement that any impasse occur with respect to all issues in 
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dispute. The court looked to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Duffy Tool & 
Stamping, L.L.C. v. NLRB, 223 F.3d 995, 999 (7th Cir. 2000), where the court held 
that “piecemeal impasse” should not give the employer a right to unilaterally 
implement changes in the terms and conditions of employment. A ruling otherwise 
would undercut the employer’s duty to bargain in good faith with the union. Thus, 
Duffy meant that impasse is required on all issues, as a whole, before there can be 
unilateral implementation.  
The Fourth District held that the union showed “good cause” under section 3-
111(a)(1); and therefore, granted the union’s motion to stay the ILRB’s decision.  
In IAFF Local 413 and City of Rockford, Case No. S-CA-15-030 (ILRB State Panel 
Apr. 11, 2017), the State Panel reversed a recommended decision of its ALJ which 
had found that the city violated sections 10(a)(4) and 10(a)(1) of the IPLRA by 
refusing to include agreed to language in the collective bargaining agreement.  The 
State Panel held that although the parties had agreed to the language itself, they 
had not agreed on whether the language would be included in the CBA or would be 
included in the employer’s rules and regulations. 
The city had unilaterally changed its sick leave policy to require that whenever an 
employee who had taken two sick leaves in the calendar year provide medical 
certification upon returning from sick leave.  The union had grieved the change 
and the parties agreed to discuss the change curing their negotiations for a 
successor CBA.  During those negotiations the parties agreed on language 
governing the medical certification requirement but the city refused to incorporate 
that language into the successor CBA.  The Coty believed that the agreed-to 
language should go in the city’s rules and regulations.  The State Panel held that 
because the parties failed to reach a meeting of the minds as to where the agreed-
to language should appear, the city did not breached its duty to bargain by refusing 
to incorporate the language in the successor contract. 
B. ULP Procedures 
In Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 241 v. ILRB, 2017 Ill App (1st) 160999, the 
First District Appellate Court held that issuing a Request For Proposals (“RFP”) 
does not constitute a sufficient “unambiguous announcement” of an employer’s 
intent to subcontract so as to trigger the statute of limitations for an unfair labor 
practice charge for failure to bargain.   
The Union filed unfair labor practice charges when the Chicago Transit Authority 
(“CTA”), in the fall of 2013, subcontracted and replaced twenty-four bargaining 
unit positions in eight job classifications without bargaining.  The replacements 
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occurred in conjunction with the implementation of the new Ventra card system 
across the CTA.  Three years earlier, in 2010, the CTA had published an RFP, which 
it made available to the union, outlining its plan and calling for proposals to 
implement an “open fare” system.  The RFP was over 100 pages long, and included 
many details of the new system, including a reduction in labor costs.  The CTA 
argued that providing the RFP to the union in 2010 was sufficient notice of the 
intent to subcontract bargaining unit work, making the union’s 2013 unfair labor 
practice charge untimely.  The ALJ agreed, the ILRB Local Panel adopted the ALJ’s 
recommended decision and order in March of 2016, and the union appealed.   
Illinois law requires that the statute of limitations for filing an unfair labor practice 
begins to run when a change in policy is “unambiguously announced.”  The court 
considered, for the first time in Illinois, whether an RFP over 100 pages long can 
constitute an “unambiguous” announcement of the intention to subcontract.  The 
ILRB had reasoned that informing the union of a request for subcontracting 
proposals was sufficient notice unless the employer expressly stated it was not. The 
court disagreed.  Analyzing precedent from out of state, the court reasoned that the 
CTA had plenty of opportunities to make its intentions clear but failed to do so.  
Rather than adopting the Local Panel’s interpretation, the court asserted the rule 
that the statute of limitations for filing an unfair labor practice charge over an 
employer’s failure to bargain over subcontracting bargaining unit work begins to 
run when the employer makes an “explicit announcement” of its intention to 
subcontract.  The case was remanded to the ILR for hearing on the merits of the 
charge. 
III. EEO DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
In Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 
2017), The Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals issued a landmark decision 
holding that employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation falls 
within sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate on 
the basis of a person’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin….” 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(a).   
Kimberly Hively was a part-time, adjunct professor at Ivy Tech Community 
College’s (“Ivy Tech”) South Bend, Indiana campus since 2000.   Hively was openly 
lesbian.  Between 2009 and 2014, Hively unsuccessfully applied for at least six full-
time positions with the school.  Hively believed she was discriminated against 
based on her sexual orientation.  Hively filed a pro se charge with the Equal 
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Employment Opportunity Commission and received a right-to-sue letter.  She sued 
in U.S. District Court in the Northern District of Illinois.  The district court 
dismissed the suit with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Title VII for sex 
discrimination.   Hively appealed the dismissal to Seventh Circuit.  The Seventh 
Circuit analyzed, de novo, what it means to discriminate on the basis of sex and 
whether actions taken on the basis of sexual orientation are a subcategory of 
actions taken on the basis of sex.   
In her majority opinion, Chief Judge Wood stated the interpretation of this 
issue is guided by the Supreme Court’s approach in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998) when addressing whether Title VII covers 
same-sex sexual harassment inflicted by a man on another man.  In Oncale, the 
Court held that male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was “assuredly 
not the principal evil” Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII, Title VII 
extends to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements.   
Hively argued that discrimination based on sexual orientation is sex 
discrimination under both a comparative and associational theory.  Under the 
comparative theory, Hively argued that if she had been a man and was sexually 
attracted to women, Ivy Tech would have neither refused to promote, nor 
terminate her.  Judge Wood stated that the discriminatory behavior cannot not 
exist without accounting for Hively’s biological sex and her lack of conformity to 
those gender stereotypes.  Judge Wood determined then that one cannot 
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation without doing so on the basis of sex. 
Under the associational theory, Hively argued that she was discriminated 
against because of whom she associates with.  This theory comes from Loving v. 
Virgina, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), where the Supreme Court held that discriminating 
against an individual for associating with a different race has discriminated against 
that individual on the basis of race.  Judge Wood applied the same logic to this case 
and concluded that Ivy Tech discriminated against Hively for intimately 
associating with other women.  Therefore, the Seventh Circuit reversed and 
remanded the district court’s judgment for further proceedings.   
Judge Posner, in a concurring opinion, agreed with the majority to reverse 
the district court’s judgment, but analyzed an alternate approach.  Judge Posner 
insisted that statutory interpretation of Title VII should be “infused” with how the 
law is significant today rather than an “originalism” approach of interpretation.  
He concluded that discrimination based on sexual orientation is essentially a 
discriminating against an individual for failure to fulfill stereotypical gender roles.   
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In a dissenting opinion, Judge Sykes, joined by Judges Bauer and Kanne, 
stated that sexual-orientation discrimination is an independent category of 
discrimination and does not fall under sex discrimination.  Judge Sykes claimed 
that the court was impatient to protect homosexuals from workplace 
discrimination, and that the majority was not authorized to amend Title VII by 
statutory interpretation.  Judge Sykes concluded that Title VII’s language does not 
prohibit sexual orientation-discrimination and that Hively’s case was properly 
dismissed in district court.
